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Over the years, acts of insecurity, lack of safety consciousness and threat of terrorism have pervaded the 
maritime landscape of the world economy. The obvious dishonest outlook and fraud-like tendencies 
which over the years, have formed the most basic characteristics of the maritime industry have never 
helped matters either way, but has indeed complicated the issue of high insecurity of the port industries 
worldwide. The amendment of the Convention on Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) introduced the 
International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS) code) as preventive measure against the 
likelihood of terrorist attacks on Ships and Port Facilities. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Maritime transport is generally regarded as an important 
facilitator of world trade, permeating all national and 
international boundaries. More than purely a facilitator, 
maritime transport is also a significant exportable service 
in many countries and in the process contributes directly 
to national Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (Yarbrough 
and Yarbrough, 2006). In this occasion, access to a 
global network of reliable, efficient and cost-effective 
maritime transport service is beneficial to all countries 
including developed and developing countries, whose 
trade in price-sensitive goods often comprises a 
significant component of their economies (WTO, 2004). 
Notwithstanding the crucial role maritime transport plays 
in our daily lives, it also carries with it significant risk 
factors which can jeopardize the economies of countries 
if unchecked. Such risk factors include among others 
maritime terrorism and its potential negative effects on 
global transport chain (Ukpere, 2010). Historically, the 
security or safety of the vessel, its cargo, passenger and 
crew has been of great concern since vessels started 
going to sea and the advent of world trade. It is recalled 
that from earliest times the vessel, cargo, passengers 
and crew were jointly and severally exposed to pirates 
who can be said to be precursors of modern terrorists  as 
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far as marine transportation is concerned. Safety mea-
sures such as carrying of some arms and ammunition, 
standard, recognized and authorized practice on the sea-
going vessels which became the rather basic and rudi-
mentary self-help security approach to shipping aimed at 
ensuring safety of the ship and cargo traveling across the 
sea from part of the world to the other. There had to be 
an intervention, which the world maritime community 
accordingly responded to. 
  
 
Background to the ISPS code 
 
Following the terrorist attacks on the twin towers in New 
York, United States of America on 11th September, 2001, 
there were deep concerns and fears by Governments 
and operators in the maritime industry that the likely next 
target of terrorist attack could be in the maritime industry. 
In the words of the Secretary General of IMO, ‘the threat 
of terrorist acts against the shipping and port industry are 
real and still exists to this day’ (IMO, 2003). This concern 
was reinforced by various media and the industry in the 
months and years preceding the adoption of the ISPS 
Code. In the editorial comment of Lloyd’s List (2, 
November, 2002:7), the necessity of the Code as 
panacea against terrorist attacks involving ships and port 
facilities  was   highlighted   and   urgent   action   for    its 
implementation was  recommended.  Accordingly,   maritime 
  
 
 
maritime and port security consequently generated 
significant attention both at the national and international 
levels (Marlow, 2002). At one of the meetings of transport 
officials from fourteen countries including the United 
States, Britain, China, Japan, Australia, there was an 
urgent call for a wider international co-operation to tackle 
the potential terrorism threats especially those against 
ports and shipping (IMO/MSC, 2003). There were fears 
that a terrorist incident directed at the international trans-
port system could lead to interrupted service, port and 
terminal closures, delays to cargo and passenger traffic 
with potential catastrophic effects on world trade. While 
addressing the 80th session of the Maritime Safety 
Committee (MSC 80) of the IMO, Mitropoulos (2003b) re-
iterated the need for the world community to be vigilante 
at all times adding that terrorists only need to be lucky 
just once with devastating consequences for the global 
maritime trade (IMO, 2004). These fears are reinforced 
when a widely acknowledged understanding is taken into 
consideration that over 90% of world ports around the 
globe is open. The inference here is clear, and that is, the 
terrorist fear appears real and the impact of such attacks 
on maritime industry could be catastrophic.  
 
 
ECONOMIC IMPACT/IMPLICATION OF INSECURE 
PORT 
 
The cruise industries being the most obvious example 
were affected by changes in market sentiments, in 
particular in the short-term. As noticed in the September 
11, 2001 attack on USA, both her economy and the 
global economy were adversely affected (Ohaku, 2005). 
The effect also has a major impact on crude oil and the 
stock market. In addition it caused the prices of premium 
to soar high in insurance companies. 
 
 
EFFECTS OF GROWTH RATE ON VARIOUS 
ECONOMIES 
 
Growth rate brings increasing instruments in defence 
industry for security purpose in general. These 
instruments are likely to crowd out other investments. It 
has made trade more difficult. Thus, the implementation 
of additional security measures has imposed large direct 
and indirect cost on travel activities and freight services. 
Furthermore, it induces change in behaviors, potentials 
less globalization, less international co-operations and 
more protectionism will potentially lead to a much 
inefficient allocation of global economic resources, which 
may lead to significant drops in productivity growth 
(Appleyard, 1997). It has also triggered Increase in 
security measures by international Maritime Organization 
and increase public expenditure of nations, particularly 
USA which spent more than 2.2 million dollars in 2003 
alone.  
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TYPES OF SECURITY AGENTS  
 
There are a good number of security agents in the 
seaport ranging from 33 to 36 existing agents, but the 
most important amongst them are considered below: 
 
The Nigerian Police Force (NPF),  
The customs and Excise (NCS),  
The Immigration officers, The Nigerian Navy (NN),  
Nigerian Port Authority (NPA), 
National Law Enforcement Agents (NDLEA),  
The State Security Service (SSS),  
The Nigerian Air Force (NAF), NIMASA. 
 
 
SECURITY OF SHIP, PORT FACILITIES AND 
PERSONNEL  
 
To begin the process, each contracting government will 
conduct port facility assessment; security assessment will 
have three essential components. Firstly, they must 
identify and evaluate important assets and infrastructures 
that are critical to the port facility as well as those areas 
or structures that if damaged, could cause significant loss 
of life or damaged to the port facilities economy or 
environment. Secondly, the assessment must identify the 
actual threats to those critical assets and infrastructures 
that are critical to the port facility as well as those areas 
or structure that, if damaged could cause significant loss 
of life or damaged to the port facility’s economy or 
environment. Then, the assessment must identify the 
actual threats to those critical assets and infrastructure in 
order to prioritize security measures. Finally, the 
assessment must address vulnerability of port facility by 
identifying it’s weakness in physical security structural 
integrity, protection system, procedural policies, 
communication systems, transport infrastructure, utilities 
and other areas within a port facility that may be a likely 
target. Once this assessment has been completed, 
contracting government can accurately evaluate risk. This 
risk management concept will be embodied in the code 
through a number of minimum functional security 
requirements for ships and ports facilities. For ships, 
these requirements will include: Ship security plans, Ship 
security officers, Company security officers and certain 
onboard equipment. 
 
 
Port facilities  
 
These requirements will include:  Port facility security 
plans, Port facility security officers and certain security 
equipments. In addition, the requirement for ships and 
port facilities include: monitoring and control access, 
monitoring the activities of people and cargo, ensuring 
that security communication are readily available. Since 
each class of ship and port facility present different risk, 
the method in which they will meet the  specific  requirement  
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of this code will be determined and eventually be 
approved by the administration or contracting govern-
ment, as the case may be. Hence, in order to communi-
cate the threat at the port facility or for a ship, the 
contracting government will set the appropriate security 
level. Security levels 1, 2 and 3 correspond to normal, 
medium and high threat situations, respectively. The 
security level creates a link between the ship and port 
facility. 
 
 
MENACE OF UNDESIRABLE PERSONS IN THE PORT  
 
The negative effect of having around and within the ports 
the presence of undesirable persons is becoming more 
organized in nature. This act of astigmatism brought 
about by the so called wharf-rats, smugglers, drug 
pushers in ports, only find way in the port solely for the 
purpose of vandalization, pilferage and theft activities. 
They cause unnecessary extortions, youthful rampages 
and crises in the port. The activities of the so-called 
hooligans, creates an atmosphere of insecurity in the 
port, hence making the port unattractive, unsafe and risk 
for maritime trade (Nigeria Year Book, 2004). In other 
development, the over-crowding of the port security 
agents all edge and corners makes the operation boring 
in the sense that they are busy doing little or nothing. 
They cause confusion here and there, thereby 
intimidating the innocent citizens. In most cases, the port 
policies precisely ganged up with the wharf rats in looting 
cargoes, smuggling and drug trafficking. 
 
 
BASIC CONCEPTS AND PRINCIPLES OF MARITIME 
AND PORT SECURITY 
 
The basic concepts, principles and aspirations of 
maritime (shipping) and port security resolve around safe 
navigation and smooth port operations (Marlow, 2002). 
For this to be achieved, however, several formalities have 
to be carried out on board the ship, it is sea and at the 
port in relation to its environment and the port’s 
infrastructural facilities and operational mechanisms 
(South African Maritime Year Book, 2004). There are 
however, key measures to be taken on board ships and 
at ports in order to achieve maritime and port security. 
These are: 
 
To prevent unauthorized persons entering a port facility 
or boarding a ship, whether from the seaside of the ship 
or when at sea. 
To prevent unauthorized weapons and goods entering a 
port facility or being taken on board a ship, either hidden 
in cargo, in stores or in baggage. 
To alert the appropriate authorities  if  a  security  incident 
arise, for instance, when being illegally boarded  or  when 
 
 
 
 
suspect items are discovered.         
 
In order to systematically achieve this, the IMO carried 
out a meaningful overhead of the various provisions of 
the SOLAS Conventions, 
 
 
Administrative requirements 
 
The administrative requirement involved the creation of a 
central designated Authority and institutional national 
focal point of contact and the assignment of general and 
specific tasks. Under the Administrative requirement, a 
Presidential Implementation Committee on Maritime 
Safety and Security (PICOMSS) was established as the 
designated Authority for the ISPS Code. This Committee 
is still in existence and chaired by the Honorable Minister 
of Transport, who reports directly to the President. 
PICOMSS is an administrative convenience to fast track 
the implementation of the ISPS Code especially as it 
affects the port facilities.  
 
  
Maritime security zones 
 
For effective implementation of the provisions of the ISPS 
Code, the country’s qualifying facilities were delineated 
into four geo-functional Maritime Security Zones (MSZs) 
as follows: Lagos MSZ, Delta MSZ, Rivers MSZ and 
Calabar MSZ. 
 
 
Technical requirements 
 
The technical requirement is the core of Nigeria’s ISPS 
Code compliance initiatives. It is the basis on which 
Nigeria was assessed to have complied with the 
provisions of the Code. The technical requirement 
involved assessments and approval of plans and the 
training of relevant personnel. It involved the identification 
and designation of Port facilities that are required to 
comply with the relevant provisions. Nigeria has seventy 
five (75) Port Facilities, out of which seventy (70) have 
approved Port Facility Security Plans (PFSP) (PICOMSS, 
2004). What this means is that the sixty five port facilities 
are compliant with the provisions of the Code for Port 
Facilities. These Port Facilities are required under the 
ISPS regime to comply with security requirements 
otherwise they will be considered unsafe for ships visits 
(PICOMSS, 2004). 
More importantly is the development of National ISPs 
Code Guidelines, which is generally referred to as 
National Maritime Security Plan (NMSP). This is a com-
prehensive plan that embodies all the security plans, Port 
Facilities and ships alike. These plans are audited and 
reviewed on a regularly basis to ascertain the needs or 
otherwise for update as the security scenario demands. 
For the Nigerian Maritime Administration,  the  lead  RSO 
  
 
 
namely the Maritime Underwater Security Company 
(MUSC) played a very key role in the development and 
audit of the National Maritime Security Plan. This is an 
on-going exercise.  
Only ships of five thousand Gross Registered 
Tonnages (GRT) are classified as SOLAS vessels and 
such come under the requirements of the ISPS Code, 
other ships are classified as Non-SOLAS vessels. A 
major component of the technical requirement was the 
identification and upgrading of security infrastructure and 
equipment (Emah, 1998). The Recognized Security 
Organisation appointed by Nigeria carried out equipment 
survey report (ESR) which was produced on a port by 
port basis. Based on approved existing global industry 
benchmarks, the technical requirement involved the esta-
blishment of national baseline standards for pot security 
infrastructure/ equipment upgrade. As a natural compo-
nent of maritime security initiatives, there is an ongoing 
implementation of the Global Maritime Distress and 
Safety (GMDSS) system by the Nigerian Safety 
Administration. Furthermore, to ensure complete 
adherence to the requirements for complying with the 
provisions of the ISPS Code, Nigeria has embarked on 
the development and integration of various telemetric and 
surveillance infrastructure for ship to shore, shore to ship, 
shore to shore, intra/inter agency communications, 
through the following maritime communication 
installations (Sekibo, 2004): 
 
Automatic Identification System (AIS) 
Vessel Traffic Management System (VTMS) 
Global Maritime Distress and Safety Systems (GMDSS) 
Ship Security alert System (SSAS)  
Long Range Identification and Tracking of Ships (LRIT) 
 Tracking/Identification of non Convention Crafts 
Command Communication/Co-ordination Centers. 
 
Overall there was upgrading of vulnerable or sub-optimal 
physical structures, port approaches, quay/land side 
access and restricted areas. An important element in the 
technical requirements, was training. In accordance with 
the dictates of the ISPS Code, training for maritime 
security was carried out at all levels in the maritime 
industry (ISPS Code, 2003). For instance, over one 
hundred top maritime executives were trained at very 
high levels both within and outside Nigeria. Other per-
sonnel trained for the same purpose include four hundred 
and thirty three (433) Port Facility Security Officers, sixty 
four (64) Company Security Officers (CSO) and Ship 
Security Officers (SSO), twenty seven (27) Port State 
security courses were also held for all the marine police 
attached to all maritime agencies in Nigeria (PICOMSS, - 
Train – the- trainer, 2004). 
 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
As indicated in the introduction, this project concerns the evaluation 
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of the impact of ISPS code on port operations in the developing 
countries in general and Nigeria in particular. 
The sources of the researcher’s data involved two major sources, 
namely: 
 
i) Primary source 
ii) Secondary source 
 
However, considering the relative newness of the subject matter, 
this research relied mainly on primary data gathered through 
questionnaires and a secondary data through semi-structured 
interviews (Bell, 2006). The rationale for this method of data 
collection is hinged on the fact that such data have the advantage 
of being authentic, practical and to a very large extent reliable 
(Straus and Corbin, 1998). The benefits of this approach are 
reinforced by Creswell (2003:181), who buttressed the originality 
and dynamic attributes of research methods, and stated that 
qualitative research is emergent rather than tightly prefigured. 
Several aspects emerge during a qualitative study. The research 
questions may change and be refined as the inquirer learns what to 
ask and to whom it should be asked. Alluding to the above, Dawson 
(2006) described qualitative research method as the exploration of 
attitudes, behaviors and experiences through such methods as 
interviews. 
Furthermore, the author added that such method attempts to get 
an in-depth opinion from participants. 
Accordingly and as has been stated earlier, the adoption of the 
qualitative research method (Silverman, 2005) for this study is 
based on the fact that the ISPS Code regime is relatively new in the 
global shipping industry and the experiences of shipping countries 
are only beginning to manifest after almost four years of operation 
of the Code as demonstrated in the preceding review of available 
literature. 
 
 
RESULT 
 
The result shows that though the Code has contributed 
immensely to port security and efficient port operation, 
NIMASA being the apex regulatory agency is fully aware 
about the Code and the compliance level by operators of 
the maritime industry.  The agency has been low in 
providing clear guidelines and directives, for example, on 
the Recognized Security Organizations (RSOs). It has 
also been observed that most vessels have not complied 
with the code. One of the issues that have posed difficulty 
in the implementation of the code is financial constraints. 
The result also shows that the issue of no or low 
compliance could be solved by relevant stakeholders 
through the institution of appropriate measures. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
One cannot deny the fact that the Code have contributed 
immensely to port security and efficient port operations in 
Nigeria. However, the Code has also presented compli-
ance challenges to the maritime administration (Moth, 
2004). Therefore, it is recommended that Nigeria should 
adopt a pragmatic approach to the Code’s implemen-
tation, by complementing security gadgets with human 
resource training  and  development  within  the  maritime 
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industry. There is an urgent need to reappraise the 
implementation of strategies with a view to making them 
more effective.  
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